The airplaneвЂ™s fuel system consisted of two wing tanks, each with 62 gallons usable, and a fuselage tank with 41.5 gallons usable. The left wing fuel tank had four to five gallons fuel the right tank had two to three gallons. The mechanic also performed a full-power run-up and filled the center fuel tank. Ground-scar calculations revealed left engine rpm was approximately 764 at impact while the right engine rpm was approximately 1315.Д®arlier on the day of the accident, a mechanic reinstalled, rigged and leak-checked the left engine servo fuel injector after it was bench tested. All three blades of the right engineвЂ™s propeller exhibited rotational scoring, indicating the engine was producing power at impact. The left engineвЂ™s propeller blades were not feathered. The flap selector was in the down position while the landing gear handle was in the up position. An energy path of dirt and debris was oriented on a magnetic heading of 120 degrees. All components necessary to sustain flight remained attached or were found in close proximity to the main wreckage. The airplane came to rest in an open field approximately 930 feet east of and about 523 feet from the departure end of MPEвЂ™s Runway 18. Another witness noticed the airplane, вЂњвЂ¦veering to the left like it was turning outвЂ¦вЂќ then noticed the airplane rolling onto its left side and pitching nose-down. The solo airline transport pilot was fatally injured.ДЄ witness saw the airplane while it was airborne and noted it rolled left and вЂњit looked like the wind caught the wing.вЂќ The witness reported the airplane rolled onto its left side and pitched nose down, impacting the ground. The airplane sustained substantial damage due to impact and a post-crash fire. On January 16, 2012, at about 1242 Central time, an Aerostar Aircraft Corporation PA-60-601P experienced loss of directional control during initial climb after takeoff and crashed in an open field near the Philadelphia (Miss.) Municipal Airport (MPE). ThatвЂ™s apparently what happened to a pilot with enough experience to have known better. One obvious danger of switching tanks just before takeoff is there will be just enough fuel in the lines to get the airplane off the ground, but no further. WhatвЂ™s often missing from these checklists is any mention of switching tanks just before takeoff.Дoing so can inadvertently position the selector on an empty tank, or one without enough fuel to power the engine through the highest-consumption phase of flight. In other airplanes, the valve must be in the вЂњbothвЂќ position, or set to draw fuel from the fullest tank(s).

In some airplanes, that can mean a single valve is open. Ensuring these kinds of problems are resolved before adding takeoff power is one reason before-takeoff checklists were invented.Д®very before-takeoff checklist weвЂ™ve seen includes some reference to ensuring the fuel system is properly configured. The reasons could involve something simple like a pitch trim setting or a door that isnвЂ™t properly latched. But takeoffs also pose risks perhaps most important among them is that the airplane isnвЂ™t ready to fly.

When considering various portions of routine flight operations, itвЂ™s safe to say that landings comprise a majority of the time spent in training and practice.

How to crossfeed engine failure